earlier writers into models. It followed from the ultimate economics profession dictum: Real economists talk in models. I resisted this approach when I prepared my class: there is only so much time in a semester, and I preferred instead to try to place the economists we studied in the context of their times. It was not until later that I came to realize that Mark's approach was yet another manifestation of the power of positivist ideas, that scientistic attitude that so strongly influenced our profession in the middle of the last century. If economics is a cumulative positive science, then surely we should be able to show how the earlier writers' ideas (or at least, those of any early writer who is any good) can be expressed using the tools of today. *** My next encounter with Mark started out very badly. I completed my dissertation, which carried the descriptively accurate but charmless title, "Recent Methodological Thought in Economics: Survey and Critique from a Philosophy of Science Perspective," in spring 1979. The next year I decided to turn it into a book. I sent a copy of the dissertation along with a proposal about ways I might change it to make it more publishable to Cambridge University Press. After what felt like an eternity they sent me a letter turning it down: it was too similar to a book they already had under contract. To my horror I soon found out that my competitor was none other than Mark Blaug. Just my luck: the person from whom I had learned my chosen field, the person whose writing inspired me to become an historian of economics, he whose very book I had so recently and shamelessly cribbed from, had written a text on the same topic as mine.
Mark's The Methodology of Economics, or, How Economists Explain (1980) A week later I finally got up the nerve to begin reading it. Slowly but surely I realized that Mark and I differed in one key respect: he placed much greater weight on the methodological prescriptions of Karl Popper and Imre Lakatos than I did. Product differentiation was possible! I first began formulating my criticisms of Mark's approach in a book review that though generally laudatory also included the line that Mark was "too fierce of a falsificationist" (Caldwell 1981, 245) . When I published my own book the next year (one that carried the catchy title of Beyond Positivism) I included a chapter in which I criticized falsificationism and endorsed "methodological pluralism."
Mark reviewed the book and savaged the idea of methodological pluralism. As he put it, in good Blaugian style: …he advocates 'methodological pluralism,' or 'let a hundred flowers bloom.' To me this seems to be tantamount to the abandonment of all standards, indeed, the abandonment of methodology itself as a discipline of study.
…'Methodological pluralism' is a sham, an excuse for never making any final judgments about competing theories. I do not believe that Bruce Caldwell really means what he says. Still, he has discovered a very effective rhetorical device for making even methodological 'dogmatists' like myself think again. His book will set a cat among pigeons (Blaug 1983, 3, 5) .
It is a testimony to Mark's even-handedness that even as he laid out his case against pluralism and in favor of the importance of testing and falsificationism, he praised my book for its treatment of the philosophy of science, which was somewhat more detailed than his had been.
This was the basis for the incredibly generous line in his review that "if one is only ever going to read one book on the philosophy of economic science, this is the book to read" (Blaug 1983, 1) .
This magnanimous gesture toward a junior scholar really made an impression on me. I am glad to see that you are willing to admit past mistakes in your "Clarifying Popper" but you go on making new mistakes, so that I sometimes wonder whether I will ever catch up with you. Still, I will never abandon the task of converting you to SANITY, that is, FALSIFICATIONISM (Blaug to Caldwell, 9 Feb 1990) . *** 6 meetings that year were at Harvard and were very well-attended with many international participants. At one point I was approached by someone who said that there were a couple of Japanese scholars who wanted to meet me. He made the introductions, and after we shook hands all around I quickly realized that their command of English was equivalent to mine of Japanese, that is, zero. We stood there uncomfortably for a moment, when suddenly another gentleman ran up to us, excitedly repeating a phrase over and over to his friends in Japanese. The scholars I had just met looked at me apologetically, as if to say, well, under the circumstances we must go, sorry, and they themselves were now murmuring the phrase. As they left I suddenly realized that the phrase was "Mark Blaug"! Their friend had spotted Mark and they were now rushing over to shake his hand. *** In my opening remarks I alluded to Mark's influence on my ideas and career. I have already mentioned how important his textbook was for me. But even more important was the extended debate we had over the merits of Popper's ideas, and where they led me. A key encounter took place at a conference on interpretation in economics that was held at Wellesley College immediately preceding the Harvard 1987 History of Economics Society meetings. As I was later to recount:
Wellesley is one of the Seven Sisters and the men's room in the building in which we met reflected it. Since the male-female ratio among economists interested in interpretation mirrors that of the profession as a whole, there was a line in the men's bathroom at coffee break time, and it was close quarters to boot. Behind me stood Mark Blaug, and hoping to pass the time a little less uncomfortably, I asked him an impossibly big question. I said, "Mark, you and I have been arguing about the merits and limitations of Popper's falsificationist methodology for nearly a decade now. Where do you think our argument stands?" After about a three-second pause he said, "We both think falsificationism is hard to put in effect in economics. You say we should abandon it, and I say we should try harder." I was stunned. Ten years' worth of work, and he had summed it up, under duress, in two sentences (Caldwell, 1994, pp. 137-38) .
This episode led me to read or reread everything I could find about Popper's position, to see if Mark was right. As I did so I came to a much better understanding, as well as appreciation, of Popper's critical rationalism, and to recognize that the methodological pluralism I had long endorsed shared many similarities with that doctrine. In any event, after I had exchanged a few rather lengthy letters with Mark, I wrote a paper on Popper that, in its first draft, read like an open letter to Mark. After I changed it into a more traditional paper, it was eventually published in the Journal of Economic Literature as "Clarifying Popper" (Caldwell 1991) . Modern Austrian economists go so far as to suggest that the Walrasian approach to the problem of multi-market equilibrium is a cul de sac: if we want to understand the process of competition, rather than the equilibrium end-state achieved by competition, we must begin by discarding such static reasoning as is implied by Walrasian GE theory. I have come slowly and extremely reluctantly to the view that they are right and that we have all been wrong (Blaug 1991, 508) . ***
